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1. Introduction
More than a billion people live today in extreme poverty. 18 million, most
of them children, die every year due to poverty-related causes. At the same
time, we witness an unprecedented accumulation of wealth and techno-
logical capabilities in the hands of affluent people in industrialized coun-
tries. It is possible, and indeed not very expensive, for the world's rich to
assist the world's poor to end their ruinous destitution. Do they have a duty
to do so? What kind of duty do they have? Is it a weak and discretionary
one or is it strong and strict? Is it only an individual and informal duty of
beneficence or is it also a collective and institutionally enforceable duty of
justice? In this paper I consider how a particular moral theory might help
us to answer these questions. According to T.M. Scanlon's contractualism,
"an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be dis-
allowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that
no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general
agreement."' Even though it is obvious that the world's rich could not jus-
tify to the world's destitute their failure to assist them, it is not so obvious
what kind of duty they have. I will argue that the kind of duty that the
world's rich have should not be primarily construed, as is often done, as an
informal duty of beneficence by isolated individuals, but as an obligation
to contribute to an institutional scheme promoting basic economic justice. I
proceed as follows. First, I clarify the structure of contractualist reasoning
(section 2). Next, I reconstruct Scanlon's discussion of assistance in What
We Owe to Each Other (sections 3.1-3.2), show that it is insufficient (sec-
tion 3.3), and explain how it can be elaborated further by shifting from
considerations of beneficence to considerations of justice (section 3.4).
Finally, I consider some important objections to, and implications of, the
approach developed here (section 4).
I argue that contractualism provides a promising way of conceiving
the demands of poverty relief because of its capacity for grounding a
' T . M . Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1998), p. 153 (hereafter ''WWO" followed by page numbers).
© Copyright 2007 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2007)
277
278 Pablo Gilabert
compelling connection between individuals' moral reasons and concerns
about larger injustices. Before I proceed, I should answer an obvious ini-
tial objection to the project of this paper. The objection is that Scanlon's
contractualism simply is not concerned with issues of social justice, but
with broader ones of interpersonal morality. Scanlon himself says that
his theory is, for example, different from Rawls's in that he does not fo-
cus on "principles of justice" applied to the basic structure of society but
on "principles of individual conduct" (WWO 228). However, Scanlon
also says that his account of contractualist justification can be "tight-
ened" in order to account for more specific contexts (such as those of
justice) {WWO 2A6)? In this paper I pursue such a "tightening." It will
become clear in the course of the argument that follows that this tighten-
ing is not only possible, but also necessary on general contractualist rea-
sons. I will show that a direct consideration of institutional justice is re-
quired once the moral reasons for poverty relief, and the factual difficul-
ties encountered in honoring them, are taken seriously.
2. Scanlon's Contractualism
Scanlon's contractualism provides an answer to two fundamental ques-
tions in moral philosophy. The first is "What standard should we use in
order to decide whether an act is wrong?" and the second is "What is the
source of motivation for complying with what morality requires?"
Scanlon's Contractualist Standard answers the first question as fol-
lows: "[A]n act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of
behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, un-
forced general agreement" {WWO 153; see also 4).
Scanlon's Contractualist Ideal answers the second question as fol-
lows: "What is basic to contractualism ... is the idea of justifiability to
each person (on grounds that he or she could not reasonably reject)"
{WWO 390, n. 8; see also 168-69).
The Contractualist Standard and the Contractualist Ideal are tightly
connected. In fact, Scanlon claims that his construal of contractualism is
superior to others precisely because it elucidates the connection between
moral assessment and moral motivation: our moral assessments of acts
should track the interpersonal justifiability of the principles used to back
them precisely because what moves us to act morally is the concern to be
•^ Scanlon also says that "unlike Rawls," he sees "political philosophy (specifically,
questions of justice) as a subdivision of moral philosophy rather than as a 'freestanding'
subject." "Tolerance, Reasonableness, Contractualism, and Intemational Justice: An In-
terview with Thomas M. Scanlon," Imprints 8, no. 2 (2005): 102-11, at p. 108.
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able to justify our actions to others. The search for mutually justifiable
principles expresses our care for standing with each other in relations of
"mutual recognition" {WWO 162).
A full explication of Scanlon's contractualism is beyond the scope of
this paper. What is important for the discussion that follows is that we
clarify some of the main features of the use of the Contractualist Stan-
dard. According to this standard, the wrongness of actions depends on
whether the principles disallowing them could be reasonably rejected. I
will mention here four features of the notion of reasonable rejection.
First, judgments of reasonable rejection are always comparative {WWO
195, 205). The assessment of a principle involves showing that it is supe-
rior or inferior to alternative ones. For example, to reasonably reject a
principle PI that allows for slavery is to endorse another alternative prin-
ciple P2 that disallows it, and this amounts to claiming that the objec-
tions to the permission of slavery are stronger than the objections to its
prohibition. Second, when deciding whether you must rely on PI or P2,
you should consider the standpoints of the individuals that would be af-
fected by them. In the previous example, you should consider how indi-
viduals who might be slaves and individuals who might be slave-owners
would be burdened or benefited by principles that allow for slavery and
principles that do not. Principles are to be reasonably rejected only by
reference to reasons that individuals have {WWO 229). Aggregative con-
siderations of the kind favored by utilitarian moral theories are not basic.
It would not do, for example, to say that the enslavement of a minority of
the members of a society could not be reasonably rejected because it
would produce a greater average or sum of well-being in that society
than its absence. Individual slaves' well-being (or lack thereof) is simply
not seriously taken into account by such a consideration.
A third important feature of reasonable rejection is that it appeals to
what Scanlon calls "generic reasons." Since principles are supposed to
apply to more than one particular case, when we consider how individu-
als would be affected by a principle we should not focus on the specific
features of these individuals, but must instead rely on reasons that any
individual facing similar circumstances can be expected to have {WWO
204). Thus, when we reject PI, we may appeal to the fact that people
have strong reason to want to be able to be in control of their lives (to
choose whether, when, and where to work, for example). This is a ge-
neric reason that all individuals may be said to share, and thus one that
seems appropriate to refer to when rejecting a principle allowing for
slavery. It is important to notice that Scanlon acknowledges the fact that
moral deliberation sometimes requires more rather than less attention to
specific facts. A principle may be applied in different ways to different
contexts. And some issues and contexts may merit the articulation of
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more local principles that need not hold elsewhere (WWO 341). Princi-
ples are not algorithmic rules to be applied uniformly, but general claims
about the comparative status of certain reasons, and as such they "leave
vi'ide room for interpretation and judgment" {WWO 199). The articulation
of principles is also a dynamic and fallible practice: "[W]e bring to moral
argument a conception of generic points of view and the reasons associ-
ated with them which reflects our general experience of life, and ... this
conception is subject to modification under the pressures of moral
thought and argument" {WWO 205-6; see also 157).
A fourth feature of the use of the Contractualist Standard is that it
assumes pluralism with respect to the kinds of considerations that go into
the articulation of generic reasons. Well-being is, for example, an impor-
tant consideration. But it is not the only one. Considerations of fairness
and responsibility are also important (WWO 204, 213-18). My discussion
of poverty relief will mainly focus on considerations of well-being, but
some important arguments based on the ideas of fairness and responsibil-
ity will be relevant as well.
3. Beneficence and Justice
This paper focuses on the question of how contractualism might help us
to identify and justify obligations on the part of the world's rich to assist
the world's poorest to end their destitution. I will call these obligations
basic positive duties. They are basic in the sense that their object is to
contribute to the poor's access to necessities without which they cannot
lead a minimally decent life (these include basic goods such as nutritious
food, health care, housing, and education). And they are positive in the
sense that their structure involves demands on the rich to actively pro-
vide the poor with what they need to achieve a minimally decent life.
The thesis I will defend is that a proper contractualist account of the ba-
sic positive duties of the rich toward the extremely poor should primarily
construe these duties as collective and enforceable duties of justice rather
than as individual and informal duties of beneficence.
3.1. An example
To see what basic positive duties involve, it will be helpful to consider an
example from the real world. Take Malawi's AIDS crisis.^ About
900,000 Malawians suffer from the deadly HIV virus. Their death can be
easily prevented by a treatment with generic antiretroviral medicines that
I^ rely on the account provided by Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (New York:
Penguin, 2005), pp. 5-9.
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the Indian generic drug producer Cipla currently makes available through
an arrangement with Malawi's government. This treatment costs $1 per
person per day. Presently, only about 400 people in Malawi are being
served by this program. The problem is that in a country where incomes
are approximately 50 cents per person per day (and where famine, ma-
laria, and environmental disruptions are rampant), it is simply impossible
for most of those facing the AIDS pandemic to pay for life-saving medi-
cines. Malawi's government is unable to cover the massive costs to treat
each AIDS sufferer. Its negotiations with international donors (including
the European Union and the United States) and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, TB, and Malaria ended in promises to fund assistance to only
25,000 people. The world's rich could, however, do more to help finance
the medical treatment of Malawians. Do they have a duty to do so? What
kind of duty would it be? How could it be justified?
3.2. Scanlon's discussion of basic positive duties
In his discussion of duties of aid, Scanlon applies the Contractualist Stan-
dard by engaging in a comparative consideration of alternative principles.
Alternative principles of aid are assessed by comparing the weight of the
generic reasons associated with the standpoints of those burdened and
benefited by them {WWO 207). Scanlon proposes the following principle:
(A) Rescue: "[l]f you are presented with a situation in which you can
prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate someone's dire
plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it
would be wrong not to do so" {WWO 224).
Scanlon explicates and defends this principle by comparing it with oth-
ers. For example, (A) is different from
(B) Helpfulness: You ought to "take others' interests into account when
[you] can very easily do so" {WWO 225).
(B) tells you to help others when no sacrifice at all would be involved
(for example, if you hear about it, you should let a friend know about a
job opening in her area of expertise). (A), on the other hand, demands
some sacrifice (for example, giving up some money rather than merely
making a phone call). The reason why (A) is more demanding than (B) is
that its beneficiaries are people who are "in dire straits: their lives are
immediately threatened, for example, or they are starving, or in great pain,
or living in conditions of bare subsistence" {WWO 224). Scanlon thinks
that (A) could not be reasonably rejected. He shows this by comparing
(A) with charity. The latter seems to involve the following principle:
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(C) Charity: Giving aid would be a good thing to do, but it would not be
wrong not to do it {WWO 225).
In circumstances in which basic positive duties are considered, (C) is too
lenient. It praises those who assist others in need, but does not take them
to have a duty to do so. Basic assistance becomes supererogatory, some-
thing that cannot be required. Clearly, people like the Malawians can
reasonably reject (C) and demand (A) instead. The reason to avoid small
sacrifices on the part of the well off is weaker than the worse offs reason
to avoid extreme hardship. But how much can people like the Malawians
demand from the world's rich? Scanlon acknowledges that "[t]here may
be stronger principles requiring a higher level of sacrifice" than (A)
{WWO 224), but he does not mention any plausible candidate. Instead, he
offers two kinds of considerations for seeing basic positive duties as im-
posing only slight or moderate sacrifices.'* The first is that when applying
(A) we must understand it as taking "account of previous contributions
(so that the principle does not demand unlimited sacrifice if it is divided
into small enough increments)" {WWO 224). With this remark, Scanlon
differentiates (A) from the familiar view advanced by Peter Singer.^
Since Singer seems to allow for an iterative approach to the comparison
between the costs to the giver and the benefits for the recipient, his view
is compatible with severe impoverishment of the well off, as each con-
ceivable small contribution (up to the point of the agent's destitution)
may, taken in isolation, involve much more benefit for the recipient than
costs to the giver.
Second, Scanlon defends the limits involved in (A) by comparing it
with the following, more demanding principle:
(D) "Intolerably Intrusive " Principle: In every decision that you make,
you ought to give no more weight to your own interests than to similar
interests of others {WWO 224).
This principle demands that we be impartial in each one of our actions,
and thus that we never give special weight to our personal projects and
relationships. (D) can, however, be reasonably rejected on impartial
grounds. This is because, according to contractualism, when we assess a
principle, we must not only consider the burdens imposed by it on agents
in a particular occasion, but also the general burdens resulting from its
Scanlon does not offer a metric to decide what counts as a "slight" or "moderate"
sacrifice. He thinks the identification of such a metric depends on specific judgments
when applying the contractualist framework to different circumstances {WWO 225).
^See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs
1 (1972): 229-43.
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adoption as a regular policy. A general cost of acceptance of (D) is the
systematic intrusive disruption of personal projects and relationships.
Since we have strong reason to value personal projects and relationships,
a principle of aid that gives them no special weight would be one that we
could reasonably reject. As a guide regarding aid, (A) is better than (D)
because it can account for the importance of the personal point of view in
the consideration of the sacrifices agents may be reasonably asked to
shoulder in order to attend to the interests of others.
3.3. Beneficence in nonideai contexts
Does a conception of basic positive duties based on (A) suffice to ac-
count for all that would be needed to ensure significant poverty relief?
This depends on whether we focus our attention on ideal or nonideal
contexts. Ideal contexts are those in which there is full (or close to full)
compliance with moral demands. Nonideal contexts are those in which
there is only partial (and especially minimal) compliance. In ideal con-
texts (A) may suffice. If most of the world's rich complied with it, severe
poverty could easily be eradicated. In our current world we do not, how-
ever, face an ideal context when we consider poverty relief. Most of the
world's rich fall short of honoring (A). Some of them (call them the Con-
scientious Rich) do comply with (A), whereas most of them (call them
the Careless Rich) do not. As we saw, Malawi's government could only
get support for a program targeting a minuscule proportion of its dying
population. Should the Conscientious Rich do more to help those who
remain destitute as a result of the moral failures of the Careless Rich?
An answer to this question would require further development of the
contractualist approach to account for nonideal contexts. Scanlon himself
does not tell us how to proceed here (although he does say that contrac-
tualism can and should focus on these kinds of scenarios).^ It is important
to notice that a principle that may not reasonably be rejected for an ideal
See Scanion, "Replies," Ratio 16 (2003): 424-39, p, 433, See also Philip Pettit, "Can
Contract Theory Ground Morality?" in James Dreier (ed,), Contemporary Debates in
Moral Theory (Maiden, Mass,: Blackwell, 2006), pp, 77-96, at pp, 81-84, A strong case
for the need for contractualism to account for nonideal contexts is presented by Thomas
Pogge, "What We Can Reasonably Reject," Philosophical Issues 11 (2001): 118-47, For
a pioneering discussion of contractualism and poverty relief in nonideal contexts, see
Elizabeth Ashford, "The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism," Ethics' \\3
(2003): 273-302, Ashford argues that given the comparative nature of reasonable rejec-
tion and the urgency of the claims of the poor, contractualism is potentially as demanding
as utilitarianism. Even though I am not sure whether contractualism would indeed be as
demanding as utilitarianism, I am sympathetic to Ashford's claim that contractualist ar-
gument would demand, under nonideal circumstances, that conscientious agents go be-
yond Scanlon's "Rescue" principle.
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context may be defective for guiding action in a nonideal one. For exam-
ple, it would be wrong for me to engage in violent action when others are
not violent. But it would not be wrong for me to be violent toward others
who are aggressively violent toward me or others. In some cases, it may
even be wrong for me not to be violent toward aggressors (such as when
someone is trying to kill my son). A moral theory that seriously seeks to
provide guidance for agents acting in the real world must introduce con-
ditional clauses telling them not only what would be the right thing to do
when (almost) everyone else would do it, but also what would be the
right thing to do when (most, or sufficiently many) others would not do
the first thing.^
A possibility is to supplement principle (A) with the following:
(E) Demanding Principle: Basic positive duties to rescue others may de-
mand more than moderate sacrifices on your part if the moral signifi-
cance of the benefits for those rescued clearly outweighs the moral sig-
nificance of the costs you would incur.
This principle may suffice to demand what is necessary to secure poverty
relief in conditions of minimal compliance. When (A) fails to do this due
to the noncompliance of the Careless Rich, (E) may succeed by demand-
ing that the Conscientious Rich fill the gap.^ Since the further sacrifice
incurred by the Conscientious Rich is arguably less significant than the
avoidance of death due to treatable diseases or starvation, the world's
poorest (call them Destitute) have stronger reasons to reject a principle
that permits the Conscientious Rich not to make further contributions
than the latter have to reject (E). The generic reasons invoked by the
Destitute trump the complaints voiced by the Conscientious Rich.
Principle (E) is not clear regarding the standard to be used when
comparing costs to the Rich with benefits for the Destitute. A natural
question is whether there is any cut-off point beyond which assistance to
others cannot be demanded. It is difficult, however, to identify such a
limit in a way that does not beg the question against the duty of benefi-
cence. To say that such a duty may be very demanding is not to show
that it is unjustifiable. This is why some authors try to show that we can
identify some limits to the demands of beneficence that are internal to the
' i take the example regarding aggressive violence and the theoretical demand for
conditional clauses (whose structure is "Do A, unless the number or proportion of A-
doers is or will be below some threshold, in which case do B, or below some other
threshold, in which case do C") from Derek Parfit, Climbing the Mountain (unpubl, ms,),
section 30,
*(E) makes demands on all the rich, not just the conscientious ones. But when the
careless do not act as they should (i.e,, when the circumstances are nonideal), (E) yields
more onerous responsibilities for the conscientious.
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very idea of heneficence.
An example is Garrett Cullity's recent proposal of the following prin-
ciple: "If it is absurd to deny that your pursuing or having x can ground
requirements on others to help you, then your pursuing or having x vio-
lates no requirement of beneficence."^ Thus, for example, since it would
be absurd to deny that your lack of access to food can ground requirements
on me to help you, then your decision not to give up your food (if you have
it) for the sake of someone else who is hungry would not be a failure to be
beneficent on your part. Furthermore, since most people have reason to
live lives that are not thoroughly centered on altruistic goals, and they
should be helped when they encounter obstacles in their pursuit, they can-
not be required to give up that pursuit in order to be beneficent to others.
This principle is reasonable. But it is not obvious that it can be used to
generate a fixed limit to the duty of beneficence. This is because the nature
of any judgment about limits to beneficence must be comparative. A pur-
suit of a certain good may be requirement-grounding in certain contexts
but not in others. In a context where A, B, and C are quite well off, it
would not be wrong for A (who is a musician) to build a collection of
expensive musical instruments, and it might even be wrong for B and C
not to help A build that collection. But in a different context in which C
is starving, it would he wrong for B to help A build the collection when
that money might instead go to feeding C. Since in this context A's pur-
suit is not requirement-grounding, it might not be absurd to ask A to
make significant sacrifices (hampering their pursuit of musical sophisti-
cation) to help C. The demandingness of (E) may then be quite extreme,
and it is not clear that any fixed limit to those demands can be justifiable
in a contractualist way.
Principle (E) seems objectionable from the point of view of fairness,
however. The Conscientious Rich may complain that under (E) they are
arbitrarily called to take up the slack left by the Careless Rich. This com-
plaint seems to assume that principles of beneficence for nonideai con-
texts should not demand that conscientious agents do more than they
would be required to do under ideal conditions. As Liam Murphy puts it,
"a person need never sacrifice so much that he would end up less well off
than he would be under full compliance from now on, but within that
constraint he must do as much good as possible."'" A rough statement of
the principle involved here might be the following:
'Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2004), p. 149.
'"Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideai Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), pp. 86-87. For a full statement of Murphy's "collective principle of benefi-
cence," see pp. 80-82.
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(F) Fair Shares Beneficence: Your basic positive duties of beneficence
are to do your fair share in the collective efforts that would be reasonably
optimal toward the eradication of destitution.
According to (F), we must construe beneficence as a collective duty. The
Rich have a collective duty to assist the Destitute. Each Rich will have to
do her fair share, which would be identified on the basis of her level of
resources when compared to other well-off people and as a function of a
general calculation of what could be reasonably demanded from the Rich
(as a group) to do to effectively contribute to the eradication of destitu-
tion. This principle may be quite demanding, but it cannot be unfairly so.
The Conscientious Rich could invoke (F) and reject (E) when consider-
ing the extent of their basic positive duties in nonideal contexts. Would
this rejection of (E) on the basis of (F) be reasonable?
Elizabeth Ashford has provided some compelling arguments to show
that one cannot, on contractualist grounds, reject (E) on the basis of (F)
when accounting for the basic positive duties of the Conscientious Rich
toward the Destitute in nonideal contexts." Let me mention two of them.
First, the Conscientious Rich cannot justify to the Destitute the choice of
(F) over (E). Imagine that Rich A and Rich B have been assigned the
collective duty to assist two Malawians in need of AIDS treatment for a
year. Assuming that A and B have the same available resources, imagine
that A's and B's fair shares would be $365 each. Now assume that A is a
Careless Rich who will not contribute her own fair share, whereas B is a
Conscientious Rich who will. According to (F), it would not be wrong
for B to assist one of the Malawians while letting the other die. Could B
justify her own decision not to contribute the extra $365 that A failed to
contribute to the dying Malawian? It seems that given the urgency of the
situation, the Malawian can reasonably demand that B contribute the ex-
tra $365. (E), not (F), seems the least rejectable principle here. The col-
lective failure of the rich as a group does not justify an absence of reme-
dial duties of individual beneficence on the part of conscientious indi-
viduals. Second, even if fairness is taken to be the salient moral consid-
eration here, one can say that the most serious unfairness in this context
is for Malawians to have been bom in conditions of destitution while
most of the rich (including B) have been bom in conditions of affluence.
It would be unfair to let the natural lottery dictate that the Malawians
face avoidable death while any of the Rich can live a luxurious life.'^
A possible reply to these arguments is to say that they mobilize im-
" Ashford, "The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism," pp, 289-92,
'^The intuitive idea here is that it is unfair to let nonchosen circumstances determine
people's dramatically unequal access to basic goods (such as subsistence) when this
could be avoided through social action.
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portant moral concems, but do not really affect (F). Murphy says, for
example, that "our strong negative reaction to failures of rescue is based
not so much on a sense that the agent acted terribly wrongly but on a
sense that his emotional indifference to the victim's plight shows him to
have an appalling character."'^ If Rich B chooses not to assist the extra
Malawian we should not say that B did something wrong, but rather that
B's character is morally reproachable. This seems to me to be a mistake.
Why do we find B's character reproachable? The obvious answer is that
what makes B's character reproachable is that it leads B to do what is
wrong. We cannot consistently reproach B's character while condoning
what makes that character reproachable.
3.4. Shift to considerations of justice
It seems that contractualist arguments would lead us to supplement (A)
with (E) and to drop (F). Is this the end of the discussion? Not if there is
an altemative to both (E) and (F) that no one could reasonably reject as
an approach to poverty relief in our real, nonideal context. It is clear that
even if (E) proves superior to (F), it occasions some moral worries that
deserve our attention. A less demanding principle that also secures the
claims of the Destitute would clearly be preferable. Even though the Des-
titute can reasonably reject (F) when compared to (E), the Conscientious
Rich could reasonably reject or limit (E) if there is an altemative princi-
ple that meets the Destitute's demands while accommodating at least
some of their own concems. I will now propose an account that incorpo-
rates the good points of (E) and (F) while avoiding their shortcomings. I
take my cue from a remark made by Ashford in her critical discussion of
(F). She suggests that the Conscientious Rich could say that "a principle
that compels compliance with an equitable distribution of the burdens of
giving aid, through a system of state taxation to fund aid to poor coun-
tries, cannot be reasonably rejected."'" Such a principle would, in secur-
ing the compliance of the Careless Rich, both satisfy the claims of the
Destitute and the reasonable reservations about faimess advanced by the
Conscientious Rich. It would, moreover, increase the efficiency of the
aid effort. In what follows I will further develop this remark into a more
detailed framework.
I suggest that we introduce a distinction between basic positive duties
"Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, p. 133,
'"Ashford, "The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism," p, 291, For Ashford's
own account of duties correlative to socioeconomic human rights, see "The Duties Im-
posed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities," in Thomas Pogge (ed,). Freedom from
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007),
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of heneficence and basic positive duties of justice. The latter, unlike the
former, are to be seen as involving institutional articulation and coercive
enforcement securing compliance. In what follows I will propose a con-
tractualist approach to seeing basic positive duties of poverty relief as
being primarily duties of justice. I do not say that they are only duties of
justice, but that they are primarily so. Certainly when justice fails we
have back-up duties of beneficence (most likely framed hy (E)). But
given the arguments I will present, it is a mistake to focus on informal
duties of beneficence when an institutional framework of justice is more
reasonable. The primary duties of the Rich are to uphold that institutional
framework where it exists, and to create it when it does not exist. The
argument that follows involves three moves. The first two briefly recount
arguments that are already in circulation, whereas the third develops in
some detail a contractualist account of basic positive duties of justice.
The first move identifies the ohject of basic positive duties of justice of
poverty relief as securing certain basic socioeconomic human rights. The
second move recalls some standing facts about radical global inequality
that make serious consideration of basic positive duties of justice feasible
and urgent. The third move, finally, provides three grounds of considera-
tion that make it reasonable, on contractualist grounds, to focus on insti-
tutional and coercive schemes rather than on informal individual de-
mands of beneficence.
(1) If there is anything that no one could reasonably reject, this must
include principles protecting basic human rights.'^ We can plausibly see
human rights as having at least two central features. The first is that they
range over certain goods, access to which is a necessary condition for
living a minimally decent life in any social context. Nutritious food,
housing, health care, and education are some of the objects of such
rights. A second central feature of human rights is that they function as
normative grounds for shaping national and international institutions by
setting basic negative and positive constraints. It follows that basic so-
cioeconomic rights must be a decisive part of any plausible conception of
global justice.'*
"Notice that I am not feeding a list of rights into the contractualist procedure (which
would be question-begging), but saying that such a list would be an output of contractual-
ist reasoning. We can certainly see the basic interests protected by hutnan rights as pro-
viding powerful generic reasons. Scanlon himself sees human rights as constraining
institutions to attend to the satisfaction of people's basic interests. See T.M. Scanlon,
"Human Rights as a Neutral Concern," in The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), pp. 113-23.
""Consider Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone is
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration [which, in Articles 22-26, include socioeconomic rights] can be fully
realized." Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (eds.), Basic Documents on Human
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(2) The institutional protection of human rights becomes particularly
relevant and urgent when their fulfillment is not, but can feasibly be, se-
cured. This is the case not only with civil and political rights, but also
with socioeconomic ones. Facts of radical inequality in our current world
show that (a) more than a billion people do not have secure access to the
objects of their socioeconomic rights; and (b) the world's Rich can fund
the policies the Destitute need to avoid extreme poverty by merely sacri-
ficing a very modest part of their aggregate income.''
(3) A natural question is what specific normative responsibilities re-
sult from universal norms stating human rights. Who should do what for
whom? Some correlative duties for institutions and individuals are easy
to identify. It is obvious that if there is a universal right against torture,
then all institutions and individuals have the universal negative duty not
to engage in or support practices of torture. It is less clear what the posi-
tive duties correlative to socioeconomic rights are (I will return to nega-
tive duties in section 4.1).'^ A contractualist approach is distinctively
helpful in this respect in at least two ways. First, since it is not only fo-
cused on the claims of recipients but also on those of agents, it poten-
tially avoids the common danger of merely stating human rights without
illuminating the correlative duties linked to them. Second, since contrac-
tualist justification is essentially comparative, demanding that our choice
of principles be grounded on their being less reasonably rejectable than
the alternatives, it helps us to decide between competing approaches by
Rights, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 28. Many authors have made
compelling cases for seeing basic socioeconomic rights as human rights. See James
Nickel, "Poverty and Rights," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 385-402; Thomas
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); and Henry Shue,
Basic Rights, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). For a systematic
account of the constitutional articulation of socioeconomic rights and their juridical im-
plementation, see C6cile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000). On emerging intemational mechanisms of justiciability, see Polly
Vizard, Poverty and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 5.
"There is some debate about the exact extent of severe global poverty. If one uses the
World Bank's $1 per day basis, then there were (as of 2001) approximately 1,092.7 mil-
lion people living in extreme poverty, whereas if one uses the more accurate $2 per day
indicator, then the number goes up (as of 2001) to 2,735 million. Pogge forcefully argues
that the second indicator (though not unproblematic) is better than the first, while also
noting that the resources needed to eradicate global poverty (if used properly) amount to
only about 1.2 percent of the aggregate income of the world's rich. See Pogge, World
Poverty and Human Rights, and "The First UN Millennium Development Goal: A Cause
for Celebration?" Journal of Human Development 5 (2004): 377-97. Regarding global
inequality, data from 2001 show that the richest 20 percent captured 82.7 percent of the
world's income, whereas the poorest 20 percent got only 1.4 percent. See David Held,
Global Covenant (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 34-37.
'^This problem is forcefully discussed by Onora O'Neill in Bounds of Justice (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 7.
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paying serious attention to their relative advantages.
The best development of an account of basic positive duties of pov-
erty relief must shift from considerations of beneficence to considera-
tions of justice. The latter involves at least two important features: (a) a
primary focus on institutional frameworks and (b) a readiness to intro-
duce coercive enforcement to secure compliance with nomiative require-
ments. Pursuant to (a), we avoid a common picture of assistance in which
individual agents have, in isolation from each other, a general imperfect
duty to assist all those in need that they must choose, at their discretion,
how to discharge. We seek, instead, an institutionally articulated picture in
which resourceful individuals acquire different clearly specified obliga-
tions that, together, constitute a scheme of collective action geared to the
eradication of destitution. Regarding (b), we entertain the introduction of
legal mechanisms securing compliance, by clearly delineating penalties for
those who do not comply with the scheme envisioned in (a).
It is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full account
of the best scheme of responsibilities of justice regarding poverty relief.'^
My philosophical goal is, instead, to provide a clear contractualist ration-
ale for shifting our priorities from informal beneficence to institutional
justice. The approach proposed here says that a reasonable construal of
basic positive duties leads to the following general principle:
(G) Scheme of Justice: Your basic positive duties of justice are to do
your fair share in the fulfillment of the coercively enforceable collective
institutional scheme that would be reasonably optimal toward the eradi-
cation of destitution.
According to the view leading to (G), we have a duty to support and act
in accordance with just institutions of poverty relief when they exist, and
help to create them when they do not. In what follows, I will characterize
the responsibilities of individuals under (G) when an institutionalized
scheme is in place. I will tum to the duty to help create some such
scheme in section 4.3 below.
Two things must be noted to clarify the content of this principle. First,
consider its similarities to and differences from (F). Like (F), (G) does not
demand from people that they do more, though it does demand that they do
no less, than their fair share to fulfill a collective basic positive duty of
"For an excellent collection of recent contributions to the emerging debate on the
allocation of nomiative responsibilities correlative to socioeconomic human rights see
Andrew Kuper (ed.). Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights?
(New York: Routledge, 2005). The emphasis on institutional articulation and coercive
enforcement was pioneered by Henry Shue. See his Basic Rights, chap. 5, and "Mediat-
ing Duties," Ethics 98 (1988): 687-704.
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poverty relief. However, unlike (F), (G) presents this collective duty as a
duty of justice, not beneficence. This difference has two consequences.
The first is that it involves a concem for securing compliance by coercive
mechanisms. The second is that (G), unlike (F), does not deny that there
may be back-up duties of beneficence that go beyond doing one's fair
share.
Second, consider (G)'s reference to the idea of a "reasonably optimal"
collective institutional scheme. A collective scheme of poverty relief is
reasonably optimal when it is the best at promoting the eradication of
destitution without introducing unreasonable burdens to the duty-bearers
(i.e., the Rich) and without disrespecting recipients (i.e., the Destitute). A
collective scheme may be optimal but not reasonably so. It might, for
example, force the Rich to engage in slave labor, or give them no democ-
ratic say on the design of the policies scheduling their contributions. Or it
might, for example, fail to empower the Destitute by seeing them as mere
passive recipients of aid instead of assisting them in the development of
their own autonomous agency. The contractualist approach relies on a
substantive normative view of persons as "reason-assessing, self-
governing creatures" (WWO 106; see also 183).^ ° We can interpret this as
having the implication that your assistance to others should cater to their
autonomous functioning. Those you help should, as much as possible, be
actively involved in the practices through which their material conditions
of agency are improved. They should be protagonists of their own ame-
lioration. This has decisive implications for institutional structures and
policies of aid. The procedure through which these are designed should,
to the extent that this is possible, be democratically accountable to those
to whom they apply.^' And the content of policies should also cater to
For detailed discussion on the substantive underpinnings of Scanlon's contractual-
ism, see Rahul Kumar, "Reasonable Reasons in Contractualist Moral Argument" Ethics
114 (2003): 6-37.
•^ 'i do not claim that the presence of democratic practices and institutions is a neces-
sary condition for the duty to introduce policies of aid. Both rich and developing coun-
tries suffer from several forms of democratic deficit. Furthermore, some "burdened socie-
ties" (to use John Rawls's expression in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1999)) are very far from being democratic, but should not for that rea-
son be left without economic assistance. Democratic institutions are, however, an impor-
tant desideratum for a view of justice fueled by contractualism. On a speculative note,
one can suggest that the introduction of practices of deliberative democracy might be a
desirable way of translating the "system of co-deliberation" (WWO 268) advocated by
contractualism into the political sphere. To the extent that this is feasible, it would serve
two functions. First, there is the epistemic value of facilitating the elucidation of genu-
inely "generic reasons." Given the complexity and variety of human experience, we can-
not expect individuals to reliably identify what is in the best interest of all by merely
engaging in introspective reasoning. Actual discussion with others of the kind favored by
deliberative democracy might help them to check their views about how others would
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their autonomous functioning. If policies of aid should bolster the inde-
pendence rather than the dependence of the Destitute, then some of them
will be more reasonable than others. It is certainly better to invest in edu-
cation and economic infrastructure, or to introduce regimes of fair trade
creating incentives for local production in poor countries, than to set up
regular shipping of finished products or make assistance contingent upon
the promotion of cultural practices that those on the receiving end do not
favor. The Destitute could reasonably reject policies of aid that do not
cater to their dignified agency but build instead relations of condescend-
ing patronage.
As I said above, it is not an objective of this paper to provide a full
account of the allocation of specific responsibilities for poverty relief. But
it is important to notice that, at a minimum, such an allocation involves a
complex "division of labor" between different agents. These include na-
tional governments, their citizens, intemational organizations (such as the
Intemational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Or-
ganization), transnational corporations, and Non-Govemmental Organiza-
tions (such as Oxfam). Each of these agents may be allocated normative
responsibilities depending, for example, on their capacity for having an
impact on poverty relief, and their historical causal role in the generation
of conditions of destitution. In general, the aim is to secure that the col-
lective effort is reasonably optimal in the sense discussed in the previous
paragraph. In the rest of this section I will provide some examples of al-
location of responsibility to illustrate the central point that an approach to
poverty relief based on (G) is superior to beneficence approaches based
on (A), (E) or (F). I will focus on three clear advantages.
(a) Efficiency. There are at least three kinds of inefficiency, usually
found in informal beneficence, that could be addressed by the introduc-
tion of coordinated institutional schemes. The first is underfunding for
certain crucial policies. A clear example is research and development
regarding drugs to cure and prevent tropical diseases. Direct research by
govemments or indirect policies setting up clear incentives for pharma-
ceutical companies (or a combination of both) could achieve decisive
victories in preventing or stopping millions of deaths each year.^ ^ This
react to altemative principles and thus to come closer to genuine agreements with them.
Second, public deliberation has also an intrinsic value: giving people the opportunity to
join as free and equal co-deliberators has the "symbolic" significance of recognizing their
status as self-governing rational and reasonable agents to whom laws must be justified.
Scanlon helpfully discusses the fact that giving certain choices to agents may have a "sym-
bolic" value as well as an "instrumental" value {WWO 253). Agents do not only care about
what choices are made, but also about who makes them. The latter, symbolic concem has to
do with the importance for people to be recognized as competent, independent free agents.
^^See Thomas Pogge, "Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program,"
Metaphilosophy 36 (2005): 182-209. See also the "Montreal Statement on the Human
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would be more efficient than aiming at funding the purchase of drugs
that may not yet exist or whose price is excessive. A second form of inef-
ficiency results from overfunding. Informal beneficence is in many cases
associated with support for "client" states and groups whom the donor
deems useful economic or political allies. This results in too much money
being channeled to assist some, while others are thoroughly neglected. A
third problem is misplaced funding priorities. This is evident, for exam-
ple, when it comes to natural disasters. Much money is channeled to at-
tend to the harmful effects of earthquakes or tsunamis, but very little is
destined to building technical infrastructure to predict their occurrence
and respond to them early. In all these cases, institutional frameworks
setting up clear targets, mechanisms for review and accountability, and
optimal allocation of funds would secure more efficiency than a chaotic
aggregation of haphazard acts of beneficence on the part of isolated do-
nors. Both the Rich and the Destitute have reasons to support institu-
tional coordination as opposed to the informal mechanisms envisioned
by (A) and (E). The Destitute have reason to prefer schemes that are
more likely to meet their needs, while the Rich have reason to support
schemes that minimize costs by actually delivering on what they pursue.
For the same reasons, both the Destitute and the Conscientious Rich have
reason to support the coercive enforcement of these institutionally coor-
dinated schemes.
(b) Fairness. If all (or most of) those who can reasonably contribute to
poverty relief did so, then each of them would have to do very little. But in
nonideal contexts, if we rely on principle (E), the complaints of the Con-
scientious Rich against the Careless Rich will go unheard, and the former
will have to shoulder the burdens avoided by the latter. This is unfair.
Since (G) demands the introduction of mechanisms securing compliance, it
attends to this unfaimess. Meeting (G) will require, of course, political
imagination and decisiveness in the enforcement of intemationally coordi-
nated strategies of poverty relief These are largely missing today. Take,
for example. Official Development Assistance (ODA) geared to meeting
the UN Millennium Development Goals (which include halving extreme
poverty by 2015). Only a few countries are fulfilling the target of 0.7 per-
cent of GNP pledged. The U.S. (the biggest economy in the world) con-
tributed (in 2005) only 0.22 percent. What are needed here are formal
schemes securing compliance. Examples would be progressive taxation of
the wealthy at national levels^^ and intemational economic penalties to
Right to Essential Medicines," in Stephen Marks (ed.). Health and Human Rights: Basic
International Documents, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
^^Consider, for example, the following proposal by Jeffrey Sachs for the United
States, which includes "a 5 percent income tax surcharge on incomes above $200,000
directed toward the U.S. contribution to end global poverty, which in 2004 would yield
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those countries and transnational corporations that fail to meet explicitly
delineated targets of contribution. I will retum to this in section 4.3 below,
(c) Motivational considerations. In ideal cases, motivating reasons
and normative reasons converge. The reasons for accepting a principle P
(together with the Contractualist Ideal to act only in justifiable ways)
also shape the desires of agents to whom P applies, and moves them to
act on P.^ "* However, in nonideal cases, this link between justification and
motivation is, in fact, severed. Some agents may recognize the validity of
P but fail to be moved to act on it because some factually (not norma-
tively) stronger desires that are not in tune with P move them to act in a
way that violates P. This is, as we saw, the case with the Careless Rich's
failure to discharge their duties of beneficence. How are conscientious
agents to respond to this kind of situation? There are, I think, two possi-
ble reasonable moves to make. The first is to introduce supplementary
motivational incentives to get agents to decide to do what they already
have moral reason to do. The introduction of taxation to fund fair poverty
relief policies creates, for example, extra prudential reasons for agents to
do what would be right for them to do.^ ^ This is a crucial way in which
(G) is different from, and better than, (F) and (E). (G) creates supplemen-
tary motivational incentives (avoiding legal penalties) that would get the
around $40 billion. That surcharge could be paid as a tax to support U.S govemmental
efforts, or it could be directed by the taxpayer to a qualifying charity or philanthropy that
has registered programs in support of the Millennium Development Goals" (The End of
Poverty, pp. 307-8). For information regarding the UN Development Goals, see http://
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
"^"See T.M. Scanlon, "Metaphysics and Morals," Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 11, no. 2 (November 2003), pp. 7-22. For an eluci-
dation of the notions of "normative" and "motivating" reasons and an excellent discus-
sion about the extent to which they may or may not converge, see Michael Smith, The
Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chap. 5. See also the discussion on Scanlon's
account of motivation in the special symposium on Scanlon's book in Social Theory and
Practice 28, no. 2 (April 2002). See, in particular, Gary Watson, "Contractualism and the
Boundaries of Morality: Remarks on Scanlon's What We Owe To Each Other," pp. 221-
41; and David Copp and David Sobel, "Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon's Ra-
tionalistic Moral Psychology," pp. 243-76.
^'it may also facilitate agents to act on desires they already have. As Judith Lichten-
berg shows, one of the explanations why people do not give more even when they want
to is that they often succumb to a more powerful desire to "keep up with the Joneses" in
the battle for positional goods (preferring, for example, to refrain from giving money to
charity when their neighbors use the same amount to buy a startling new car). See
Lichtenberg, "Absence and the Unfond Heart: Why People are Less Giving than They
Might Be," in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.). The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Dis-
tant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 75-97. Taxation solves
this problem by imposing uniform contributions on all competitors. These considerations
also apply to market competition. For example, some CEOs would be happy to make their
companies more environmentally responsible, but worry that if they do so unilaterally,
they would be led to bankruptcy if competitors do not make the same costly adjustments.
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Careless Rich to do what is right. This move seems reasonable given the
facts that the deaths of millions of Destitute, and unfairly heavy demands
on the Conscientious Rich, would otherwise result.
The second move is to devise practices through which people's moti-
vating reasons may become colored by their normative ones. Scanlon
distinguishes between reasons in the normative sense and reasons in the
operative sense (fVWO 18-19). The latter are the reasons the agent takes
to be valid, whereas the former are the reasons the agent should take to
be valid. Scanlon rightly points out that reflective agents, to the extent
that they proceed rationally, could not but seek those operative reasons
that match normative reasons. But this does not imply that operative rea-
sons that match normative reasons automatically become actually moti-
vating reasons for an agent. This gap can partially be filled by the move
mentioned in the previous paragraph. But this cannot be the end of the
story.
We must, further, try to do two important things. First, we must make
sure that in cases in which we mobilize motivating reasons whose con-
tent is not that of the normative ones (as is the case with the Careless
Rich who pay the taxes because they want to avoid the penalties and not
because they believe they ought to contribute to the eradication of desti-
tution), we can still provide a normatively sound justification for doing
so. And, second, we must not give up on the attempt to get agents to
shape not only their operative reasons, but also their motivating reasons
in terms of their normative ones. The first task can be secured by empha-
sizing the public nature of contractualist justification.^* Coercive laws
can be publicly justified by making available to all those affected nonre-
jectable grounds for their introduction. Contractualism need not (like
some forms of utilitarianism) generate a distinction between esoteric and
exoteric reasons. The latter are the same as the former: a coercive
scheme can and must be justified to agents on grounds that they could
not reasonably reject, even if those are not the grounds they choose to act
from. The second task is more complicated, and is one usually neglected
by contractualists. It is not enough to assume that rational agents can act
on the basis of the normative reasons that they have. We must also in-
quire about how they may be more or less ready to do so. This is why
practices of public justification may need to be connected with the crea-
tion of a culture of "solidarity with strangers," in which those to whom
we owe reasons and right conduct are also emotionally salient to us. No-
tice that the presence of this culture is not a need from the point of view
dimension of publicity in contractualist reasoning is illuminatingly explored by
Samuel Freeman, "Moral Contractualism as a Foundation for Interpersonal Morality," in
Dreier (ed.). Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, pp. 57-76.
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of justification, but only from the point of view of motivation. Since we
have independent normative reasons to assist distant others, we should
see to it that we nourish our moral sensibility in such a way that those
reasons gain traction in our habits, conduct, and institutions.
These issues regarding motivation certainly require further explora-
tion. The general philosophical point underlying my discussion is, how-
ever, the following. Contractualist reasoning in nonideai contexts must
take not only the point of view of the morally reflective agent (for whom
justification and motivation converge) but also the point of view of the
observer (who notices the extent to which justification and motivation in
fact come apart in the psychological economy of acting persons). The
challenge is to pay due attention to the second perspective without relin-
quishing the demands of the first." This is what the introduction of (G)
attempts to do in the case of poverty relief, and what insistence on infor-
mal beneficence seems largely to miss.
4. Objections and Implications
4.1. Causat and normative responsibitity
An important principled complaint against seeing basic positive duties as
duties of justice is the familiar libertarian objection. Libertarians appeal
to the following principle:
(H) Justice as negative duties: Your duties of justice are only negative
duties not to unduly harm others. You can only have positive duties of
justice in a derivative way, as rectification for undue harm done.^ ^
According to (H), fundamental enforceable duties of justice can only be
negative. It does make sense, for example, to institute coercive enforce-
ment of laws banning physical aggression to innocent people. But we
cannot enforce aid to the needy. Aid may be required as a matter of char-
ity or informal beneficence, but not as a matter of justice. The only ex-
ception is when assisting others would be the appropriate way of com-
pensating them for an undue harm done to them. For example, it makes
sense to say that people have a negative duty of justice not to make oth-
ers destitute. If this negative duty is violated, assistance would be justi-
fied as rectification. Thus, applied to the issue of poverty relief, the liber-
tarian objection would amount to the following argument:
•^ I^n his account of motivation, in chapter 4 of WWO, Scanlon only considers the first
perspective.
Other routes to derived positive duties are to make promises and enter into contracts.
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Normative premise: Principle (H) applied to the problem of destitution:
(H*) You have a negative duty of justice not to unduly harm others by
making them destitute. You can only have positive duties of justice of
poverty relief in a derivative way, as rectification for violating the nega-
tive duty referred to in the previous sentence.
Factual premise: The Rich have not been causally involved in bringing
about the destitution of the Destitute.
Conclusion: The Rich do not have a positive duty of justice of poverty
relief toward the Destitute.^'
This argument has two serious problems: (1) it does not acknowledge the
extent to which the Rich do have derivative positive duties of justice to-
ward the Destitute; (2) it relies on an unacceptably narrow account of
normative responsibility.^" Explaining each of these points will further
elaborate the contractualist approach developed here.
(1) Derived basic positive duties of justice. The first problem with the
libertarian argument is that its factual premise is false. It is hardly the
case that the global Rich have not been systematically involved in unduly
harming the global Destitute. Even if it were true that destitution in poor
countries primarily results from their governments' inefficient and cor-
rupt policies and their lack of encouragement of efficient economic prac-
tices, it would be a mistake to think that the world's Rich are not impli-
cated. As Thomas Pogge's recent work forcefully shows, the global Rich
have been using their overwhelming bargaining power to shape the inter-
national political and economic landscape in a way that makes it possible
and desirable for elites in poor countries to act as they do. Two character-
istics of that order are what Pogge calls the "intemational borrowing
privilege" and the "intemational resource privilege" (under which au-
thoritarian or corrupt elites in poor countries are intemationally allowed,
and even encouraged, to appropriate and sell the natural resources of the
countries they rule, and contract public debt in their people's name, with
devastating political and economic consequences).^' Moreover, we
should not think that only govemments, and not the members of the in-
^'For a recent example of this line of argument, see Jan Narveson, "We Don't Owe
Them a Thing! A Tough-Minded but Soft-Hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy,"
The Monist 86 (2003): 419-33; and "Welfare and Wealth: Poverty and Justice in Today's
World," Journal of Ethics 8 (2004): 305-48. For a discussion of libertarianism, see Pablo
Gilabert, "Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge," The
Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2006): 193-216.
' "A third problem is that it fails to see that legal coercion can be authorized and moni-
tored through democratic practices.
'^ Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, pp. 22-23, 112-16.
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temational business community, are to blame. There is ample evidence
that some sectors of the latter have supported harmful governments and
policies in poor countries.^^ In sum, exploitation and domination are
common features of international relations, and destitution cannot be ex-
plained without paying attention to them.
(2) Nonderived basic positive duties of justice. Contractualist reason-
ing would certainly support views of enforceable duties of poverty relief
as rectification for harm done. But it need not be limited to that. In fact, a
contractualist case can be built for rejecting the normative premise of the
libertarian argument. We can show that principle (H*) could reasonably be
rejected, and thus that the Rich also have nonderived basic positive duties
of justice to assist the Destitute. To do this, we need to consider more
closely the notion of responsibility. We can distinguish between normative
and causal responsibility regarding the suffering of the Destitute. A is
causally responsible for the destitution of B if B's destitution results from a
causal process in which A has been involved. A is normatively responsible
for relieving B's destitution if there is a principle P according to which it
would be wrong for A not to do so. Principle (H*) assumes that for P to be
an acceptable principle, it must include as one of its conditions that A is
causally responsible for B's destitution. Should we then abandon (G),
which does not include this condition, and endorse (H*), which includes
it? Is it true that normative responsibility must track causal responsibility?
(G) generates schemes that impose costs on the Rich to benefit the
Destitute. This imposition is coercively enforceable, for example by
means of taxation. To see whether such an enforcement of basic positive
duties is acceptable without having to rely on facts of causal responsibil-
ity, we need to compare the generic reasons involved. A defender of (G)
would have to show that the generic reasons for rejecting (H*) are
stronger than the generic reasons for rejecting (G). Is the interest of the
Rich in not being taxed weightier than the interest of the Destitute in
there being public institutions securing assistance to those in dire need?
It seems fairly obvious, from an impartial perspective, that the concerns
of the Destitute have more weight than those of the Rich. Of course, the
kind of assistance required from the Rich cannot be unreasonable (for
example involving slave labor). But (G) recognizes that. What (G) does
not recognize is a sweeping entitlement not to be taxed to help fellow
human beings in dire need. Given the empirical data discussed above, the
global Rich can do their fair share to help eradicate the extreme poverty
of the Destitute at a rather minimal cost to themselves. An enforceable
•'^ See the recent "global corruption reports" by Transparency International (TI) at http://
www.globalcorniptionreport.org. The chairman of TI, Peter Eigen, is reported to claim that
"a lot of the responsibility for corruption in the developing world has been with the North-
em companies and Northern institutions" (The Guardian Weekly, April 1-7, 2004, p. 3).
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scheme securing this would partially curtail the economic liberty of the
Rich (not allowing them to do whatever they want with their pretax in-
come), but this is not a sufficient ground for rejecting a principle on
whose observance the survival of millions of people depends.
Some libertarians might protest by invoking a construal of the con-
tractual situation according to which no principle can be acceptable
unless it proves mutually beneficial to all the parties involved. Since it is
not clear that (G) would benefit the Rich as well as the Destitute (as the
Rich are much more likely to be on the giving rather than on the receiv-
ing side of the equation), it is not clear that the Rich could not reasonably
reject (G). But Scanlon rightly condemns mutual advantage contractari-
anism (JVWO 180, 192-93, 207-8). There are cases in which you could
not reasonably reject a principle even if you could rationally (in the in-
strumental sense of "rationally" that tracks personal advantage as the
decisive factor) prefer an alternative one. When one reflects on whether
to reject a principle, one must take into account the standpoints of all
those concerned, considering how the principle would burden agents and
benefit subjects. But in doing so one must "leav[e] aside the likelihood of
one's actually falling in either of these two classes" {WWO 208). The
Rich may find that they are worse off under (G) than they would be un-
der a principle like (H*) allowing them not to contribute to the eradica-
tion of poverty in whose causal production they have not been involved.
But this fact does not ground reasonable rejection of (G), because the
Destitute would be much more seriously worse off under the alternative
principle than the Rich would be under (G). A truly impartial, reasonable
consideration of people's interests would support (G). The positions of
power and advantage from which people evaluate alternative principles
should not be allowed to determine their judgment.
In a contractualist approach, claims of normative responsibility de-
pend on substantive moral considerations. Scanlon helpfully distin-
guishes between claims about what we owe to each other (claims about
normative responsibility) and claims about what actions can be causally
attributed to certain agents (WWO 248, 290). It is important not to con-
flate these two kinds of claims. Their connection, if and when it exists,
depends on substantive principles about the conditions under which the
choices made by certain agents should be seen as bearing on the way
their interactions with others ought to be morally framed. Claims regard-
ing derived and nonderived positive duties are substantive claims about
normative responsibility. Whereas the former are backward-looking, the
latter are forward-looking. The former reach judgments about what indi-
viduals or groups owe to each other on the basis of what they did to each
other, whereas the latter reach such judgments on the basis of what indi-
viduals or groups can do for each other. Given the weight of the generic
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reason all agents have to avoid destitution, and the relatively low cost at
which the Rich could help eradicate it, it is implausible to say that basic
positive duties of justice should only be seen as derivative ones. Perhaps
claims about past harms can be cited to identify the primary bearers of
basic positive duties. Other things being equal, if A and B are Rich and C
is Destitute, and A is causally responsible for C s destitution whereas B
is not, then A should be the first to do something to assist C. However, it
makes sense to say that B may still have to do something even if he has
not been involved in causing C s destitution. (For example, if A is not able
to do all that is needed to help eradicate C s destitution without B's assis-
tance, then it seems wrong to say that B is not required to do anything.)
I suggest, thus, that views of normative responsibility based on claims
about causal responsibility be understood as establishing sufficient or pri-
ority conditions, but not necessary conditions, for basic assistance. This
suggestion would apply to Christian Barry's recent proposal of the "contri-
bution principle," according to which "agents are responsible for address-
ing acute deprivations when they have contributed, or are contributing, to
bringing them about."^^ Despite what this principle says, some people may
be normatively responsible for addressing acute deprivations even if they
have not contributed, or are not contributing, to bringing them about. Thus
this principle would be implausible if it refers to necessary as well as suffi-
cient conditions for poverty relief. The contribution principle might instead
be seen as presenting, at best, an order of priority rather than an absolute
clause: we should focus jirst, though not exclusively, on the normative re-
sponsibilities of those who have engaged in harmful activities.^ '*
'^Christian Barry, "Applying the Contribution Principle," Metaphilosophy 36 (2005):
210-27, p. 211. For a useful discussion of different conceptions of normative responsibil-
ity, see David Miller, "Distributing Responsibilities," in Kuper (ed.). Global Responsi-
bilities, pp. 95-115.
•'''We should also notice that not all backward-looking views are based on claims
about harm. Some of them may track claims about merit, which may hold in the absence
of any previous harmful activities. For example, it may be argued that A should prioritize
assistance to B over assistance to C because C s condition of destitution has resulted from
C s choices whereas B's condition of destitution has come about independently of B's
choices. Furthermore, it may be argued that if A and D are wealthy and can help B or C,
if A's wealth is the result of A's choices whereas D's wealth has come about independ-
ently of D's choices, then we should give priority to D over A in the allocation of duties
to aid. These considerations seem intuitively appealing. However, given the urgency of
the claims of the Destitute and the low costs that the Rich would have to shoulder to as-
sist them, their role should be, at best, to provide some guidelines regarding how to allo-
cate specific basic positive duties to the Rich, not regarding whether the Rich as a group
have the normative responsibility to uphold a scheme of poverty relief.
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4.2. Gtobat scope
The "tightening" of contractualist reasoning has led us to viewing (G) as
a global principle of justice. This view may be the target of the objection
that the scope of (G) cannot be global because there is no global state.
This objection relies on the claim that principles of distributive justice
are only triggered within the boundaries of nation-states. Support for this
claim might be found in a recent article by Thomas Nagel.^ ^ Nagel ar-
gues that positive rights regarding distributive justice only hold for rela-
tions between people who share a centralized political community, a na-
tion-state, because of the unique way in which its citizens are asked to
make and to follow the laws under which they live. Since there is no
global state, global basic positive duties (which cater to a subset of the
group of positive distributive rights) can at best be humanitarian duties of
rescue, not enforceable duties of justice. I think that this view is mis-
taken. Even if it were true that in the absence of a centralized global state
we cannot introduce fully egalitarian principles of global equality of op-
portunity, or global versions of Rawls's Difference Principle, we may
still find sufficient grounds for articulating robust principles of poverty
relief that are not merely humanitarian demands, but stringent and en-
forceable duties of justice. It is possible to carve out conceptual space for
a domain of global justice focused on basic socioeconomic human rights,
which are different from weaker humanitarian demands and from stronger
schemes of domestic justice.^* This can be done in at least two ways.
First, we can refer to facts of globalization that have already been
generating diverse forms of supranational interdependence, including
dense economic and political international practices and institutions. For
"Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 33
(2005): 113-47.
•'*I am not saying that we should not accept global versions of the principles of equal-
ity of opportunity and the Difference Principle. I simply put this issue aside, and, focus-
ing on basic rights of poverty relief, I claim that they are more than merely weak humani-
tarian claims. Nagel does recognize that there are some universal demands associated
with human rights, noticing that any Kantian moral theory (including Scanlon's contrac-
tualism) would support them ("The Problem of Global Justice," p. 131). Nagel mentions
"negative rights" against "violence, enslavement, and coercion" (ibid.). He also refers to
a universal "duty of rescue toward people in dire straights" (p. 132). What Nagel wants to
do is to draw a clear line between these minimal duties of universal morality and more
demanding ones connected with egalitarian distributive justice. I do not think that this
view accommodates the robust account of basic positive duties of justice demanded in
this paper. First, these duties may be more demanding than humanitarian duties of occa-
sional and easy rescue. The target of (G) is the eradication of severe poverty. Second, (G)
involves enforceable schemes. These would contain much more comprehensive institu-
tions and mechanisms than those currently provided by charity NGOs and the World
Bank (the two examples mentioned by Nagel).
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example, the rulings of the World Trade Organization and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund have pervasive effects on the well-being of people
across the world. The demands of "structural adjustment" by the IMF
contributed to increasing levels of poverty in Latin America, while the
failure of the WTO to bring down tariffs on imports by rich countries
arguably prevented one of the most efficient ways of combating destitu-
tion in poor countries. These facts of globalization seem sufficient for
grounding the intemational articulation of basic positive duties of justice
and the call for reforms in the organization of international institutions so
as to make them democratically accountable to those affected by them.^ ^
A global political community of sorts is already in the process of being
created. For example, a growing body of international law has been gen-
erated since the UN was established. Substantively sound and proce-
durally legitimate ways of articulating, expanding, and implementing this
body of law can be further developed. Nation-states need not be obliter-
ated, but their sovereignty might reasonably be seen as conditional upon
their compliance with intemational regulations geared to securing the
TO
fulfillment of basic human rights, including socioeconomic ones.
Alternatively, we can invoke a cosmopolitan perspective according to
which basic positive duties are not merely humanitarian duties but also
duties of global justice simply because some human beings can, at rea-
sonable cost to themselves, assist other human beings in need. According
to the cosmopolitan view, normative responsibilities of basic justice are
not conditional upon common membership in an already existing politi-
cal community. Democratic structures of domestic and global govern-
ance may then be seen not as a precondition for the existence of basic
positive duties of justice, but as a way of securing their fair and efficient
institutional articulation and discharge.
It seems to me that contractualist reasoning can support both of these
views when compared to the narrow, nation-state-centered approach.
Should we choose one of them? The strength of the first view is that it
relies on the obvious facts of increasing political, economic (and, we
should add, military) interdependence. The second view seems by con-
trast Utopian, not anchored in actual historical processes. The strength of
the second view is, on the other hand, its moral simplicity and directed-
is the position defended in Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Extra Rempubli-
cam NuUa Justitia?" Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006): 147-75. The facts regard-
ing global harms discussed in section 4.1 should also be taken into account here.
For a discussion of the possibility of "multilevel citizenship" (i.e., of people's par-
ticipation in interlocking political communities comprising national, intetnational, and
transnational institutions), see Held, Global Covenant. Held argues that multilevel citi-
zenship does not amount to a much-feared unaccountable "world state," A principle of
subsidiarity can be retained, securing a relative level of autonomy for nation-states while
also expanding the power of supranational institutions dealing with issues of global concem.
Contractualism and Poverty Relief 303
ness. It says, upfront, that we have enforceable duties of justice to assist
human beings in need (regardless of their national membership) when-
ever we can do so at reasonable cost to ourselves. Another important ad-
vantage of the cosmopolitan view is that it can prevent the following
possible response to the claim that (G) yields global duties of justice.
Some people in rich countries might decide to interrupt the ongoing
process of globalization, retreat into their own nation-states, and invoke
the first view to say that they do not have global basic positive duties of
justice because no robust associative facts regarding their relation to the
rest of the world remain. This response would not be acceptable if we hold
the cosmopolitan view, according to which the retreating Rich would con-
tinue to have basic positive duties of justice if they can still do something
to alleviate the suffering of the Destitute. This consideration seems to
support the second view when compared to the first. But in fact both
views can be combined, provided that the first is seen as presenting suf-
ficient, but not necessary, conditions for global normative responsibility.
The previous paragraph proceeds on the basis of the assumption that
the scope of contractualist reasoning about political morality is always
already universal; that the extent to which structures of governance are
inclusive or exclusive should be justifiable to members and nonmembers
alike. This assumption may seem arbitrary. But so would the opposite
assumption, which uncritically grants the outcomes of the natural lottery
that determines that some people are born in rich political communities
while others are destined to poor ones. Surely the former assumption is
stronger, on grounds of faimess, than the latter.
4.3. Institutional reform in nonideal circumstances
We have pursued a "tightening" of contractualist reasoning regarding prin-
ciples of poverty relief. The best such principles would introduce, follow-
ing the general guidelines of (G), collective and enforceable schemes of
assistance rather than individual and informal duties of beneficence. But
we must consider an obvious and important challenge. Institutional struc-
tures implementing (G) are largely missing. It is thus not clear what the
responsibilities of national govemments, intemational institutions, and in-
dividuals are. The second part of the view leading to (G) says that just in-
stitutions implementing (G) should be created when they do not exist. I
will thus conclude this paper by introducing some tentative remarks on the
difficult issue of institutional reform under nonideal circumstances.
(1) Transitional standpoint. First, we should properly identify the
context of our discussion. It seems clear that we are neither under condi-
tions in which (G) is fully implemented nor in a Hobbesian state of na-
ture where no normative and institutional frameworks whatsoever exist.
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Our standpoint is a transitional one. We can identify trends toward the
identification and implementation of schemes of intemational justice.
Think about human rights law. There have been numerous intemational
treaties and conventions, and many of their demands have been enshrined
in national constitutions and pursued by intemational institutional bodies
and civil society. We certainly lack sufficient mechanisms for articulat-
ing and enforcing the implementation of basic socioeconomic human
rights, but we are not facing a situation in which their great importance is
not recognized or where no attempts are being made to secure them. For
example, the govemments of developed countries have pledged 0.7 of
their GDP to halve world poverty by 2015. They have pledged to make
the Doha round of the WTO a "development round." Of course, they are
not fully delivering on these commitments. But now that these commit-
ments have been made, the burden is on them to show why they are not
delivering, not on others to say why they should.
A transitional standpoint involves a dynamic approach. It is guided by
both ideal-theoretical and feasibility considerations. In the case of pov-
erty relief, an ideal-theoretical state would be one in which national and
intemational institutions are in place securing the full implementation of
what (G) demands.^^ Since we are not there yet, we must ask ourselves
what feasible steps can be taken to approach that state. We may then
identify different paths of reform, and entertain trajectories of reform
passing through successive thresholds of feasibility. Reforms that are not
feasible now may become feasible later on as a result of successfully in-
troducing other feasible reforms. This means that for any given context,
we must ask what paths of reform are reasonable and feasible, and
choose those that are likely to lead to generating conditions of feasibility
for further reasonable improvements.
(2) Multiple institutional paths. I mentioned tax and transfer schemes
by means of which the govemments of developed countries can get their
Rich to assist the Destitute. There are different ways in which these
schemes can be conceived. An important consideration is whether their
recipients are govemments or individuals and associations. It seems rea-
sonable to say that when political institutions in a developing country are
robust and democratically accountable, they should be the recipients of
aid. When developing countries are ruled by despotic or cormpt elites, aid
^'i am not saying that this would be the final ideal-theoretical state regarding global
justice. The latter might well be more demanding, including schemes of global equality
of opportunity and a global version of Rawls's Difference Principle. For a defense of
such a stronger picture, see Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004). As I said in section 4.2,1 am putting this aside. An ongo-
ing scheme securing poverty relief is an aspect of global justice even if further trajecto-
ries of reform should eventually go deeper.
Contractualism and Poverty Relief 305
may be directed instead to sectors of civil society that are more likely to
pursue reform of political institutions or economically sound practices."*"
Direct aid is not the only reasonable mechanism. Other reasonable
institutional reforms are conceivable. An important example would con-
cem the rules of intemational trade. In fact, "rich countries have cost
poor countries three times more in trade restrictions than they give in
total development aid.""' Despite talk about the benefits of "free trade"
and "fair trade" and the pledge to make the Doha round a "development
round," developed countries have used their overwhelming bargaining
power in the WTO to get developing countries to open their economy to
developed countries' manufactured products and services without recip-
rocally opening their own economy to developing countries' agricultural
products. A sustainable scheme of poverty relief should certainly involve
changing the rules of trade in order to make them fairer."^
Multiple paths of reform can then be pursued. A difficult problem is
to make them enforceable. The final target of reforms might be an inter-
national body able to oversee and enforce implementations of (G). A re-
cent proposal in this direction is the establishment (within the UN) of an
Economic and Social Security Council to coordinate poverty reduction
and global development policies."*^ If (and while) this is not immediately
feasible, other steps can be taken. The World Bank, the IMF and the
WTO can be made to work toward poverty relief. This can be brought
about through changes in their procedures of decision-making and their
outcomes. Two recent proposals by Stiglitz seeking to overcome the "de-
mocratic deficit" of these intemational organizations are worth immediate
''"On the importance of targeting institution-building, see Mathias Risse, "What We
Owe to the Global Poor," The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 81-117. I agree with William
Easterly that many aid policies have been ineffective. It is true that "sixty years of count-
less reform schemes to aid agencies and dozens of different plans, and $2,3 trillion later,
the aid industry is still failing to reach the beautiful goal." The White Man 's Burden (New
York: Penguin, 2006), p. 11. But this sweeping claim may obscure important facts. See
on this Branko Milanovic, "Reply to Easterly: Thought-Provoking and Misleading," Cato
Unbound, April 5, 2006. $2.3 trillion is not so much money given the time period consid-
ered, and the bulk of that money was actually not used in policies targeting development
and poverty alleviation. As we saw in previous sections, developed countries have also
simultaneously pursued other policies that effectively thwarted development and fair
institution-building.
•"Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 78. In
chapter 3, Stiglitz advances several feasible proposals for making trade fairer.
For example, developed countries should allow developing countries to protect their
nascent industries, and to export their agricultural products.
See Frances Stewart and Sam Daws, "An Economic and Social Security Council at
the United Nations," at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/qehqehwps/qehwps68.htm. See
also the UN Press Release at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaef3043.doc.
htm; Peter Singer, One World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 200; and
Held, Global Covenant, p. 164.
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consideration. First, "strong freedom of information acts" should be intro-
duced to make sure that their proceedings are open to public scmtiny. Sec-
ond, steps should be taken to enhance "the ability of developing countries
to participate meaningfully in decision making, by providing them with
assistance in assessing the impact on them of proposed changes." More
long-term strategies targeting the reform of intemational structures of gov-
emance (reducing the current imbalance in bargaining power and strength-
ening democratic accountability) can thereby be empowered. Informed
political agents are more likely to choose political reforms that actually
take their needs into account. Furthermore, the collective action of devel-
oping countries may have real consequences. One of the reasons why the
unfair trade schemes pushed by developed countries at the Doha round
have not gone through is that many developing countries are starting to
negotiate as a block. This may eventually facilitate deeper and more per-
manent changes in the structures of global govemance.
(3) Motivation for reform. A natural question is whether we can ex-
pect citizens of developed countries to accept being taxed to support pov-
erty relief schemes, or to support trade regimes that reduce some of the
advantages they have become accustomed to. Is it really feasible to pur-
sue these immediate institutional reforms? It seems to me that a skeptical
answer to this question is not warranted. Citizens of wealthy countries
have both moral and prudential reasons to favor institutional reforms im-
plementing (G). The moral reasons should be obvious from our discus-
sion so far. Even if moral reasons are not always operative or dominant,
they are by no means impotent. There is in fact a growing consensus on
the urgency of global issues among citizens in wealthy societies. Con-
sider the example of the threat posed by global warming. Even when
many politicians in the United States atid the lobbying corporations that
determine much of their campaign finances neglect their duty to support
schemes for pollution control, the pressure by conscientious citizens is
gaining strength (and is already reaching fmition at the local and state
level, as is the case with the recent environmental controls introduced by
Califomia). Similar developments can be expected with respect to pov-
erty relief policies.
Citizens of wealthy societies also have pmdential reasons to support
policies implementing (G). These may include the fear of growing illegal
immigration, terrorism, diseases, and intemational insecurity, and the
prospect for potential economic gains to be expected as the Destitute be-
come producers of goods the Rich can consume and consumers of goods
the Rich can sell to them. As Kant argued in "Perpetual Peace," pruden-
tial reasons may converge with moral reasons, and sometimes the former
"•Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, p. 253.
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may he particularly efficient in generating an international order the lat-
ter already demand."*^  Glohal justice is not a zero-sum game.
(4) Superiority with respect to informal beneficence. Another worry
might be that it is not clear that the conscientious Rich should focus on
institutional reforms rather than on informal beneficence because the
prospects of the former are uncertain whereas contributing to beneficent
NGOs has a clear and immediate impact. This worry is not, I think, war-
ranted. First, as we saw, informal beneficence is far from being an effi-
cient mechanism, and thus its prospects regarding poverty relief are quite
uncertain. Second, the paths of institutional reform are not so uncertain. I
mentioned several proposals for immediate feasible reforms and some
proposals for long-term reforms. The uncertainty surrounding institutional
reforms will decrease as more research and action is devoted to them. It is
in this respect relevant to note that Oxfam, one of the most respected
NGOs focused on poverty relief, itself devotes significant resources to
campaigns pressuring national and international institutions to introduce
coordinated institutional reforms."* Finally, the institutional approach
demanded by (G) is more sustainable, as it focuses on the creation of a
background structure of ongoing institutions rather than on occasional
acts of rescue. It thus addresses the need to generate compliance prevent-
ing the common problems of "free riding" and "assistance fatigue."
I conclude that in the absence of just institutions, the first priority
should be to create them rather than to relapse into beneficence. The rea-
son is that just institutions, as we saw, are more likely than informal as-
sistance to secure the fair discharge of basic positive duties of poverty
relief. Back-up duties of beneficence may be seen as functioning in ex-
treme circumstances in which just institutions neither exist nor are likely
to be created, but it is hard to claim that these circumstances really hold
with respect to poverty relief. In fact, to prioritize informal beneficence
when just institutions can be created is to fail to take seriously the de-
mands of poverty relief. An analogy between the global and the domestic
contexts would, I think, make this clear. Before the introduction of the
welfare state in industrialized capitalist societies, conscientious agents
had the choice of devoting their efforts to informal beneficence or to in-
stitutional reform. No one who recognizes the importance of poverty re-
lief would deny that it was a good thing that these agents favored the
second option. The same can be said about our current global situation.
Institutional reforms are, as we saw, feasible. Thus, devoting our efforts
"^Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," in The Cambridge Edition of the Works
of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996), pp. 311 -51.
An example is Oxfam's "Make Trade Fair" campaign. See http://www.oxfam.org/
en/programs/campaigns/maketradefair.
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to their creation should have priority.
(5) Extent of demandingness of the duty to contribute to institutional
reform. I have argued that in the absence of just institutions, the first pri-
ority should be to create them rather than to relapse into informal benefi-
cence. But how strong is the duty to contribute to institutional reform?''^
If (G) is implemented, then the problems of beneficence under nonideal
circumstances would largely be overcome. But if the institutions imple-
menting (G) are not in place, then the duty to help create them is likely to
face problems similar to those facing beneficence. I will thus conclude
this paper by doing two things. First, I will compare the demandingness
of the duty to engage in institutional reform to implement (G) and the
demandingness of (E) and (F). Second, I will address concems about the
feasibility of the former in view of its possible collision with special re-
sponsibilities. In both cases, I will focus on showing that the shift from
informal beneficence to institutional justice is reasonable, and that a tran-
sitional standpoint helps us to see why and how this is so.
With respect to the first issue, we should start by saying that a duty to
engage in institutional reform should not be as weak as (F). (F) is im-
plausible with respect to informal beneficence, as we saw. But it is also
implausible with respect to the duty to contribute to institutional reform.
Just as it would be wrong to let a second child drown because you saved
one and the other person who can help is not ready to do her fair share
and save the other, so would it be wrong for a conscientious Rich not to
do more than her fair share to promote institutional reform because an-
other Rich is not ready to do her fair share.
A natural question then is whether the duty to engage in institutional
reform might be as demanding as (E). My answer to this question is that
even if initially this is the case, in time it is not likely to be so. A duty of
''^ I am assuming that a conception of justice must include something Wke. what Rawls
calls a "natural duty of justice" to not only support existing just institutions but also to
contribute to their creation when they do not exist. Rawls's discussion of the second part
of the natural duty is, however, very brief, and does not include a precise account of the
extent of its demandingness. Rawls says that the natural duty of justice "constrains us to
further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too
much cost to ourselves." Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1999), p. 99; see also pp. 293-94. This formulation does not identify a
cut-off point. It also does not address the issue of the scope of the duty. An important
objection in this respect is that it cannot explain why agents owe allegiance to the institu-
tions of their own country as opposed to those of other countries. See A. John Simmons,
Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979),
chap. VI. For a powerful response, see Christopher Heath Wellman, "Political Obligation
and the Particularity Requirement," Legal Theory 10 (2004): 97-115. My approach, like
Wellman's, starts with a general moral account of positive duties, and proceeds to iden-
tify their institutional articulation on the basis of considerations of fairness and effi-
ciency. For the sake of brevity, however, I will not discuss Rawls's view here.
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beneficence framed by (E) and a duty to engage in institutional reforms
geared to the implementation of (G) may make similar demands in terms
of the quantity of effort and time and resources that agents must devote
to them under nonideai circumstances. But there is a qualitative differ-
ence between the two duties that is likely to have quantitative conse-
quences down the road. The two duties demand different kinds of things.
The duty to engage in institutional reform has the peculiarity of being
focused on the introduction of institutional schemes securing fair and
efficient mechanisms that, to the extent that they are introduced, diminish
the requirements on particular individuals. (E) does not clearly do this.''^
Thus, from a transitional standpoint that is concerned with both issues of
fairness and the urgency of the claims of the Destitute, shifting from in-
formal beneficence to the pursuit of institutional justice seems warranted,
as the temporal trajectories of these duties are likely to be different. The
latter is directly concerned with targeting conditions of feasibility for less
demanding schemes of aid.
The second issue then arises whether a demanding view of the duty to
contribute to institutional reform would be infeasible because it might
demand serious restrictions on individuals' special responsibilities to-
ward those who are near and dear to them. This is a difficult issue that
deserves more detailed discussion than I can provide here. For the pur-
poses of this paper we can respond, however, by saying three things.
First, in its rejection of (D) (the "Intolerably Intrusive" Principle), a con-
tractualist approach makes room for special relationships and responsi-
bilities. It does not, however, take them as unqualified "trumping cards."
Their boundaries must undergo impartial assessment. An agent A can
reasonably reject B's unrestrained pursuit of a special relationship with C
when it leads to harm to A or to neglecting A's needs when these are ur-
gent and C's are not.'*' Second, it should be noticed that if the demands
of institutional reform are infeasible because they collide with people's
•"^Someone might say that a principle of beneficence can itself lead us to endorse
schedules of institutional reform if they are shown to be the most efficient way of im-
proving the condition of those in need. This would involve, however, a broader use of the
term "beneficence" than the one used here. It would make beneficence roughly equiva-
lent to a general category of moral basic positive duties. Something like this seems to be
the view pursued by Liam Murphy in "Institutions and the Demands of Justice," Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs 27 (1999): 251-91, I agree with Murphy insofar as I also do not
think that there is a radical discontinuity between moral and institutional considerations. 1
think, however, that it is good to sharpen the distinction between informal assistance
("beneficence" in the narrow sense used in this paper) and institutional mechanisms of
aid ("justice" in the narrow sense used in this paper).
"* For a detailed discussion of this and related issues, see Arash Abizadeh and Pablo
Gilabert, "Is TTiere a Genuine Tension between Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism and Special
Responsibilities?" Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). See also Kwame Anthony Appiah,
Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: Norton, 2006), chap, 10,
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pursuit of their special relationships, then so would the demands of in-
formal beneficence framed by (E). Thus, this consideration would not
provide reasons for favoring (E) (the relevant altemative) over duties
oriented toward the implementation of (G).
Third, and most importantly, we should again emphasize the dynamic
nature of trajectories of institutional reform by taking a transitional
standpoint. For the reasons given above, trajectories focused on (G) are
specifically geared to generating schemes of discharge of basic positive
duties that fairly and efficiently give proper attention to the demands of
all those affected. These trajectories may involve, as we saw, successive
steps. Even if today it is not feasible to expect people to fully honor their
basic positive duties of justice, we can start by entertaining some feasible
reforms that could generate conditions of feasibility for further reforms.
Let me conclude with an example of what some moral philosophers in
research universities can do. Some of the reasons why many people do
not choose to engage in institutional reform are that the moral arguments
for it are not clear, and that the actual institutional mechanisms envisaged
have not been carefully specified. We should not, however, take these
circumstances as parametric factors that we must assume to be fixed.
Whether compelling moral arguments circulate and whether careful insti-
tutional proposals exist partly depends on whether we actually try to pro-
duce them. It would not be a bad idea, for example, for moral philosophy
professors in research universities to lead the creation of interdisciplinary
projects devoted to conceptual and empirical exploration of issues of
global justice and poverty relief. This may be a feasible first step to make
feasible what does not seem now to be so.^"
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